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Addicted individuals continue substance use despite the knowledge of harmful consequences and often report having no choice but to
consume. Computational psychiatry accounts have linked this clinical observation to difficulties in making flexible and goal-directed
decisions in dynamic environments via consideration of potential alternative choices. To probe this in alcohol-dependent patients
(n 43) versus healthy volunteers (n 35), human participants performed an anticorrelated decision-making task during functional
neuroimaging. Via computational modeling, we investigated behavioral and neural signatures of inference regarding the alternative
option. While healthy control subjects exploited the anticorrelated structure of the task to guide decision-making, alcohol-dependent
patients were relatively better explained by a model-free strategy due to reduced inference on the alternative option after punishment.
Whereasmodel-free prediction error signals were preserved, alcohol-dependent patients exhibited bluntedmedial prefrontal signatures
of inference on the alternative option. This reduction was associated with patients’ behavioral deficit in updating the alternative choice
option and their obsessive-compulsive drinking habits. All results remained significant when adjusting for potential confounders (e.g.,
neuropsychologicalmeasures and graymatter density). A disturbed integration of alternative choice options implemented by themedial
prefrontal cortex appears to be one important explanation for thepuzzlingquestionofwhy addicted individuals continuedrug consump-
tion despite negative consequences.
Introduction
A key characteristic of addictive disorders is that addicted indi-
viduals continue substance use despite evident harmful conse-
quences. Addicted individuals regularly report having no choice
but to consume. This suggests an impairment of integrating dif-
ferent choice options and their potential consequences. Thus,
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Significance Statement
In addiction, patients maintain substance use despite devastating consequences and often report having no choice but to con-
sume. These clinical observations have been theoretically linked to disturbedmechanismsof inference, for example, to difficulties
when learning statistical regularities of the environmental structure to guide decisions. Using computational modeling, we dem-
onstrate disturbed inference on alternative choice options in alcohol addiction. Patients neglecting “what might have happened”
was accompaniedbyblunted codingof inference regarding alternative choice options in themedial prefrontal cortex.An impaired
integrationof alternative choiceoptions implementedby themedial prefrontal cortexmight contribute toongoingdrug consump-
tion in the face of evident negative consequences.
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neglecting “what might have happened”
may rigidly bias decision-making toward
choice options that have been proven to
be rewarding in the past (Chiu et al., 2008;
Redish et al., 2008; Dayan, 2009).
Computational psychiatry accounts
(Montague et al., 2012) have theoretically
linked these maladaptive decision-
making processes to disturbed mecha-
nisms of inference (Huys et al., 2015), for
example, difficulties learning the stati-
stical regularities of the environmental
structure to guide decisions. Deficits in
cognitive flexibility are well known in pa-
tients experiencing addiction (Bechara
and Damasio, 2002; Garavan and Stout,
2005; Ersche et al., 2011; Goldstein and
Volkow, 2011). Thus, addiction has been
theorized as one prime example of a
breakdown of behavioral control in favor
of simple and inflexible learning processes
(Everitt and Robbins, 2005; Dayan, 2009;
Lucantonio et al., 2012) with support
from first behavioral studies (Sebold et al.,
2014; Voon et al., 2015). One such exam-
ple is model-free reinforcement learning
(RL), where choice values are adjusted via
learning from past rewards only. How-
ever, model-free RL neglects the environ-
mental structure, for example the relation
between chosen and unchosen options.
Reversal learning is a well known para-
digm challenging the individual to flexibly
adapt behavior, and addicted individuals
are impaired in such tasks (Izquierdo
and Jentsch, 2012). However, in alcohol-
dependent patients, parameters ofmodel-
free RL did not account for the observed
deficit in flexible behavioral adaptation,
and neural signatures of model-free RL
did not differ between groups (Park et
al., 2010; Deserno et al., 2015c). One
potential explanation is that alcohol-
dependent patients are specifically
impaired in inference regarding the in-
terdependencies of choice values (e.g., if
one option is bad, the other one might
be good), which might hamper alcohol-
dependent individuals in flexibly adapt-
ing their behavior.
In the same vein, concurrent track-
ing of how different decision options re-
late to each other, thus, generalization
about what might have happened, pro-
motes flexible behavioral adaptation in healthy individuals
(Hampton et al., 2006; Gla¨scher et al., 2009; Li and Daw, 2011;
Schlagenhauf et al., 2014). In such reversal learning tasks, this
depends on inference regarding the anticorrelated task struc-
ture, for example, when a drop in one decision value impli-
cates a rise of the other value (Fig. 1A). Neural signatures of
flexible behavioral adaptation and also model-free RL were
previously found in a network consisting of ventral striatum as
well as the medial and lateral prefrontal cortices (O’Doherty et
al., 2004; Hampton et al., 2006; Daw et al., 2011; Deserno et al.,
2015b). There is evidence that the medial prefrontal cortex
(mPFC) is a key region in the concurrent tracking of choice
values and thus enables flexible behavioral adaptation (Hamp-
ton et al., 2006). Here, we probe whether the modification of
basic model-free RL with respect to the interdependencies of
choice values, reflecting the anticorrelated environmental
structure, is disturbed in alcohol addiction and whether this




Figure 1. Schematic: parallel double-updating of chosen and unchosen choice values.A, At time t, an agent in state St passes to
a new state St1 by the action a, observing the outcome R, which leads to the reward prediction error as the difference between
an expected and an actually gained reward. Accordingly, the agent updates the chosen value for the next trial,Qt1. Although not
explicitly observed, the agent can conclude from the anticorrelated task structurewhatmight have happened (R) if he had chosen
analternative actiona, resulting in a fictive prediction error. Thus, by inference on the anticorrelated task structure andparallel
to updating chosen values, the agent additionally double-updates unchosen values Qt1. Individuals might differ in their degree
of inference on the environmental structure. The individual degree of double updating is therefore weighted by the parameter.
B, Trajectories of values of both stimuli as a functionof (top:0, single-updatemodel;middle:1, double-updatemodel;
bottom: free parameter, individually weighted double-update model) for one exemplary participant. Small colored dots in
the upper edge of the figure indicate the chosen stimulus per trial, black circles indicate outcome per trial (1, reward; 1,
punishment). The figure was generated by adapting plotting functions included in the HGF toolbox as part of the TNU Algorithms
for Psychiatry Advancing Science (TAPAS Mathys et al., 2014). C, Effect of inference, double-updating, on chosen values. For one
exemplary participant, values of the respective chosen option are plotted per trial, as a function of the two alternative control
strategies: pure single updating ( 0, neglecting what might have happened, red) vs pure-double-updating ( 1, full
inferenceon the task structure, blue). Hence, thedifferenceof both (here, highlighted ingray) represents anestimateof thedegree
of inference on the anticorrelated task structure. In our analysis of functional imaging data, we probe how this difference in choice
values modulates the coding of the core teaching signal, the reward prediction error  for chosen values.
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To address this, we used functional magnetic resonance im-
aging (fMRI) during decision-making in a dynamic environment
to examine flexible behavioral adaptation. Importantly, reward
contingencies of different options were anticorrelated: whenever
one stimulus was a good choice, the other onewould be theworse
choice, and vice versa. When confronted with options such as
those in this task, individuals make choices based on decision
values computed for the options at hand (Rangel et al., 2008).
These can either be deduced by action–reward pairings or by
inference on the anticorrelated reward probabilities (Hampton et
al., 2006; Bromberg-Martin et al., 2010). We hypothesized that
alcohol-dependent patients fail to integrate this inference, “what
might have happened,” into the value of the chosen options. To
this end, we compared RL models that differ in updating the
unchosen option. As a neural substrate, we predicted prefrontal
signatures reflecting inference on alternative options to be re-
duced in alcohol-dependent patients.
Materials andMethods
Participants. Forty-three alcohol-dependent patients and 35 healthy par-
ticipants were included. fMRI data were available for 35 healthy partici-
pants and 34 patients. Patients were recruited from an inpatient
detoxification and rehabilitation program (Soteria Klinik Leipzig) and
had abstained from alcohol for at least 8 d (range, 8–56 d; mean, 28.80 d;
SD, 11.85 d). All patients were free of any psychotropic medication for at
least four plasma half-lives except for one patient taking doxepin due to
sleeping problems. All subjects underwent the Structured Clinical Inter-
view for Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM),
fourth edition, Axis I Disorders (SCID-I; First et al., 2001) and patients
additionally underwent a semi-structured interview on their individual
addiction history. Alcohol dependence was diagnosed in all patients ac-
cording to DSM, fifth edition, and International Statistical Classification
of Diseases and Related Health Problems, 10th revision. Alcohol-
dependent patients did not meet the criteria of any current comorbid
psychiatric disorder. Included control participants did not report any
current nor past psychiatric disorder (SCID-I). See Table 1 for demo-
graphic, neuropsychological, and clinical characteristics. The local ethics
committee approved the study. Participants gave written informed con-
sent and were reimbursed for participation.
Measures of addiction severity. Addiction severity was assessed using
(1) time-line follow back score (TLFB; Sobell, 1992), to assess alcohol
units consumed in the month before treatment; (2) obsessive-
compulsive drinking scale (OCDS; Anton et al., 1995); (3) alcohol crav-
ing questionnaire (ACQ; Tiffany et al., 2000); and (4) alcohol use
disorder identification test (AUDIT; Allen et al., 1997).
Neurocognitive measurements. Alcohol dependence is known to be
linked with a number of cognitive deficits (Bates et al., 2002; Goldstein et
al., 2004), which have recently been shown to be associatedwith impaired
model-based decision-making (Sebold et al., 2014). Therefore, partici-
pants completed a battery of neurocognitive tests on the following do-
mains: working memory (Digit Span; Wechsler, 1955); cognitive speed
(Digit-Symbol-Substitution Test; Wechsler, 1955); reasoning (Matrices
Test; Amthauer et al., 1999); verbal IQ (German vocabulary test, Schmidt
and Metzler, 1992); visual attention (Reitan Trail Making A; Reitan,
1955); and complex attention (Reitan Trail Making B; Reitan, 1955).
Results and group comparisons are summarized in Table 1. We com-
puted a factor analysis (principle component analysis) to extract com-
posite measures of neurocognitive functioning. Based on an eigenvector
cutoff of1, a factor analysis with an oblique rotation (direct oblimin)
yielded a single factor solution, accounting for 59.61% of variance in the
six test results obtained. The composite measure of neurocognitive func-
tioning was subsequently used as a covariate in control analyses.
Decision-making task. Participants performed reward-based decision-
making in a dynamic environment that requires flexible behavioral ad-
aptation (Fig. 2A, illustration). In a total of 160 trials, participants
decided between two cards, each showing a different geometric stimulus
(maximum response time, 1.5 s). Importantly, the task incorporated a
simple higher-order structure: reward probabilities associated with the
two choice options were anticorrelated; whenever stimulus A was a good
choice, stimulus B would be the worse choice, and vice versa. Even
though the outcome for the alternative option is never shown, the agent
can infer from the anticorrelation of the options what might have hap-
pened if he had taken the other stimulus (Fig. 1A–C). Reward contingen-
cies remained stable for the first 55 trials (first, “prereversal,” phase) and
also for the last 35 trials (last, “postreversal,” phase). During the second
Table 1. Sample characteristics
Control subjects Patients Test statistic
Demographic characteristics
Age (35/43) 42.00 10.49 44.42 10.21 t 1.03, p.307
Sex (male/female, 35/43) 25/10 34/9 2 0.434
Smokers (35/42) 16 33 2 0.003
Handedness (Edinburgh handedness scale, right/both/left, 35/39) 32/0/3 33/5/1 2 0.521
School leaving qualification (none/compulsory basic secondary
schooling/intermediate school certificate/university entrance qualification, 35/41)
0/5/14/16 1/12/25/3 2 0.001
Total years of unemployment (35/41) 0.9 1.58 4.54 6.37 t 3.27, p 0.002
Neuropsychological measurements
Reasoning (matrices, 35/41) 10.91 4.00 6.71 3.64 t 4.80, p0.001
Working memory (backward digit span, 35/42) 7.49 2.50 6.19 2.00 t 2.54, p 0.013
Cognitive speed (TMT A, 35/42) 27.31 14.44 38.82 18.10 t3.04, p 0.003
Complex attention (TMT B, 35/42) 62.84 28.59 101.82 79.52 t 2.75, p 0.007
Cognitive speed (DSST, 35/41) 79.91 18.38 60.85 16.14 t 4.81, p0.001
Premorbid IQ (German vocabulary test, 35/41) 31.74 3.38 24.20 6.96 t 5.85, p0.001
Barrat impulsiveness scale (35/42) 59.96 10.03 65.81 9.18 t 2.80, p 0.007
Clinical characteristics
Alcohol units (month before participation/beginning of treatment, 35/38) 20.43 21.67 301.61 294.06 t 5.64, p0.001
Obsessive-compulsive drinking scale (31/42) 3.65 3.86 25.55 9.78 t 11.80, p0.001
Alcohol use disorder identification test (35/42) 4.26 3.18 26.24 8.72 t 14.14, p0.001
Alcohol craving questionnaire (34/42) 1.3 0.38 2.04 0.88 t 4.42, p0.001
Duration of dependence (years) (36) 14.64 9.96
Preceding detoxification treatments (35) 3.43 3.99
Beck depression inventory (33/41) 5.09 6.32 13.59 10.02 t 4.24, p0.001
Data are reported as the mean SD, unless otherwise indicated. DSST, Digit symbol substitution test; TMT, trail making test.
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(“reversal”) phase, reward contingencies changed (four changes in total,
after 15 or 20 trials; Fig. 2B). This required participants to flexibly adapt
their behavior.
Right-side versus left-side location of the stimuli on the screen was ran-
domized over trials. After the participant had chosen one stimulus by left or
right button press, the selected stimulus was highlighted and depicted for
1.5 sminus the reaction time.Feedbackwas shownfor0.5 s (monetarywinvs
monetary loss, indicatedbya10Eurocent coinoracrossed10Eurocent coin,
respectively).During the intertrial interval, a fixation crosswas presented for
a variable duration (jittered and exponentially distributed; range, 1–12.5 s).
If no responseoccurredduring thedecisionwindow, themessage “too slow”
was presented, and no outcome was delivered.
In a prior instruction and training session outside the MRI scanner,
participants were informed that one of the two cards had a superior
chance of winning money (probabilistic nature of the task). They were
told that, depending on their choice, they could either win 10 cents or
lose 10 cents per trial, that the aim was to win as much as possible, and
that the total amount ofmoney gainedwould be paid out at the end of the
experiment. Participants performed 20 training trials with a different set
of cards and without any reversal of reward contingencies. Subsequently,
participants were instructed that reward probabilities could change over
the course of the main experiment and that they should track such
changes to win as much money as possible. Importantly, no other infor-
mation or details on reversals or the correlation of outcomes was pro-
vided, such that patients had no explicitly instructed knowledge about
the anticorrelated task structure before the experiment.
Analysis of choice behavior. Behavioral performance was quantified
as the percentage of correct choices (choices of the stimulus with 80%
reward probability) and was analyzed using repeated-measures
ANOVA including the between-subject factor “group” (patients vs
control subjects) and the within-subject factor “phase” (prereversal:
first 35 trials; reversal: intermediate 90 trials; postreversal: last 35
trials).
We additionally investigated the effect of previous feedback on subse-
quent decisions, namely repeating choices after reward (“win–stay”) and
shifting responses after losses (“lose–shift”). Furthermore, we quantified




Figure 2. Decision-making task. A, Exemplary trial sequence. B, One of the stimuli was assigned with a reward probability of 80% and a punishment probability of 20% (vice versa for the other
stimulus). Reward contingencies remained stable for the first 55 trials (prereversal block) and also for the last 35 trials (postreversal block). In between, reward contingencies changed four times
(reversal block). C, Raw data results. Correct choices differed significantly as a function of phase (prereversal, reversal, postreversal, F 21.78, p 0.001). We observed amain effect group and a
significant interaction of phase	 group (F 3.27, p 0.04). Between-group post hoc t tests revealed that group differences were present in the reversal phase (t 3.48, p 0.001) and in the
postreversal phase (t 3.36, p 0.001), but not in the initial stable prereversal phase (t 1.69, p 0.10). Error bars indicate Standard Errors of the Mean.
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for the same choice in the preceding two trials, relative to all loss trials
(den Ouden et al., 2013).
Computational modeling. Different RL models were fitted to the data.
All models learn the values of choice options via reward prediction errors
(RPEs), a teaching signal that compares received rewards and expected
values. In essence, the first three RLmodels differ in the degree of updat-
ing both the chosen and alternative decision options, as follows: (1) a
model-free learner updating values for the chosen stimulus only, which
neglects the anticorrelated task structure, which we refer to as the single-
update (SU) model; (2) a learner updating values of chosen and uncho-
sen stimuli equally using inference on the anticorrelated task structure,
which we refer to as the double-update (DU) model; and (3) a model
connecting SU and DU models by individually weighting the degree of
double-update learning, thus accounting for individual variability. This
is given by the weighting parameter . In the following, we refer to this
model as the iDU model.
First, the model-free SU-algorithm updates a decision value Qa,t for
the chosen stimulus via the RPE Qa,t, which is defined as the difference
between the received rewardRt and the anticipated reward for the chosen
stimulus Qa,t:
Qa,t  Rt  Qa,t (1)
The RPE Qa,t is used to iteratively update decision values of the chosen
decision value trial-by-trial:
Qa,t1  Qa,t  Qa,t (2)
Here,  depicts the learning rate, which weights the influence of RPEs
Qa,t on the updated values.  has natural boundaries between 0 and 1.
Importantly, this model neglects the anticorrelated task structure by up-
dating only decision values for the chosen stimulus, while the value of the
alternative, unchosen stimulus Qua,t remains unchanged, as follows:
Qua,t1  Qua,t (3)
Second, the DU algorithm updates chosen and unchosen decision values
in each trial. This takes into account the anticorrelated structure of the
task. In ourmodeling approach, this is captured by additionally updating
the unchosen decision values based on a different error signal, which
compares the fictive outcome thatmight have happenedwith the value of
the unchosen option. The RPE for the DU model is as follows:
Qua,t  Rt Qua,t (4)
The same learning rate is used for updating unchosen values, as follows:
Qua,t1  Qua,t  Qua,t (5)
Equation 5 gives the same weight to the update of unchosen decision
values as to the chosen decision values. Third, and in contrast, we assume
that the degree of updating the alternative choice option differs across
individuals. To account for interindividual variability regarding this pro-
cess, we additionally constructed an iDUmodel to quantify each individ-
ual’s degree of DU learning. This is provided by the parameter , which
weights the learning rate  for the unchosen RPE Qua,t:
Qua,t1  Qua,t  Qua,t (6)
In the iDUmodel, the RPE Qa,t is weighted by the product of the learning
rate for the chosen value and the weighting parameter , where   0
reduces to the SU model, and   1 to the DU model. Note that this
results in lower learning rates for DU learning, which is in line with the
key assumption that double-update learning is computationally more
costly.
Figure 1 provides a schematic of inference on the anticorrelated task
structure with respect to unchosen choice values (double-updating). In
the task at hand, as double-updating depends on inference derived from
actually experienced feedback, updating of the unchosen stimulus always
relies on learning from feedback for the chosen stimulus (i.e., is rather
unlikely to be a process independent from updating the chosen stimulus;
for comparison with an identical implementation, see Li et al., 2011).We
ran 1000 simulations of choices on the reward sequences of the empirical
data via the used RL models by setting   0,   0.5, and   1, and
confirmed clear superiority of double updating in terms of correct
choices in the middle reversal phase (68.60% correct choices for   0;
75.50% for  0.50; and 75.66% for  1).
For tasks such as the one used here, some previous work indicated that
models with a dynamically changing learning rate might fit behavior
better than models with a static learning rate (Krugel et al., 2009). The
so-called Sutton-K1 model updates the learning rate dynamically as a
function of the change in prediction errors encountered (Sutton, 1992).
It was previously discussed and used as a non-hierarchical approxima-
tion of a dynamic learning rate (Chumbley et al., 2012; Kepecs and
Mainen, 2012; Landy et al., 2012; Iglesias et al., 2013). By including this
model, we tested whether a model with a dynamic learning rate captures
the observed behavior better than algorithms with a fixed learning rate.
In this model, values are also updated via prediction errors as in Equa-
tions 1 and 2. The dynamic learning rate is transformed with a logistic






This is initialized with 	 0 corresponding to an initial learning rate of
0.5. Note that this parameter is called
 in the original publication, which
we here change to 	 because
 is used throughout the article to refer to the
temperature in the decision model. The update of 	 for the next trial
depends on the change in reward prediction errors where:
	t1  	t  Qa,t ht, (8)
and
ht1  
ht  t  Qa,t  max 

1 t, 0. (9)
The value of given in Equation 8 is a free parameter, which controls the
individual degree of dynamic update of the learning rate. 	 is a sensitivity
parameter of the learning rate, controlling the influence of the RPE of the
last trial on a trial-by-trial basis as a function of .
In sum, we had a total of four learning algorithms, namely SU, DU,
iDU, and Sutton-K1. In all algorithms, we include the initial value of one
option as a free parameter (Huys et al., 2011, 2012; Schlagenhauf et al.,
2014).
Decision model. For all models, decisions are transformed into action
probabilities by applying a softmax equation. The softmax equation in-
cludes the temperature 
, which reflects the stochasticity of the choices;






Learning from rewards versus punishments. We also aimed to test the
hypothesis of whether a potential deficit of alcohol-dependent patients in
DU learning differs specifically as a function of learning from rewards
versus learning frompunishments in our task. In ourmodels, we account
for this by estimating separate learning rates and temperatures for reward
(rew) andpunishment (pun) trials corresponding torew,pun, and
rew,

pun, respectively. We did so by assuming that these trial types refer to
rather categorical differences in how tightly learned values influence
choices.
Model fitting. Fitting was performed in the same Bayesian framework
as introduced in the studies by Huys et al. (2011, 2012) and as used in
several studies, including between-group designs (Chowdhury et al.,
2013; Deserno et al., 2015a) and patient studies (Schlagenhauf et al.,
2014; Deserno et al., 2015c). To infer the maximum a posteriori estimate
of parameters  for each individual i, we use a Gaussian prior with mean
and variance  and , as follows:
MAPi argmax log p(Y  ) p(, ), (11)
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where Y represents the data in terms of actions Ai per subject i. We set
priors empirically to themaximum-likelihood estimates of and given
the data by all subjects included, as follows:
MLi argmax log p(Y  ), (12)
and achieve this by using expectation maximization. Constrained pa-
rameters were transformed to a logistic (, ) or exponential (
) distri-
bution to enforce constraints and to render normally distributed
parameter estimates. All modeling analyses were performed using Mat-
lab 2010b. It should be noted that the empirical prior mainly serves to
mildly regularize parameters at the population level. As this was per-
formed based on the data of participants, this renders between-group
parameters valid.
Model comparison. For allmodels, we approximate themodel evidence
by integrating out free parameters. This integral was approximated by
sampling from the empirical prior distribution (Huys et al., 2011, 2012).
Due to the hierarchical fitting procedure, which also fits priormeans and
variances (see Model fitting), such marginalized likelihoods can lead to
overly optimistic results by biasing model selection toward more com-
plex models. To obviate this problem, we used leave-one-out cross-
validation by fitting the datawithout subject k and thenmarginalizing for
subject k via sampling from the empirical prior distribution of sample
n k. Then, the marginal or integrated likelihood (the model evidence)
based on leave-one-out cross-validation was subjected to a random-
effects Bayesian model selection procedure (spm_BMS function con-
tained in SPM8; Stephan et al., 2009) to compute expected posterior
probabilities (PPs) and exceedance probabilities (XPs) for each model.
XPs give the probability that PPs of a model differ from that of another
model in the comparison set. Importantly, after running BMS initially
across all participants, this was then performed separately for control
subjects and patients.
Adequacy of the best-fitting model. In addition to relative model com-
parison, we assessed the quality of the best-fitting model as follows: (1)
determining identifiability via the rank of the Jacobian matrix (Bamber
and van Santen, 1985, 2000) and via assessing correlations between the
inferred parameters; (2) measures of absolute model fit via calculating
McFadden’s pseudo-R 2 and assessing how many of each participant’s
choices can be explained by the model (corresponds to each individual’s
negative log-likelihood relative to the number of trials (Daw, 2009; Huys
et al., 2011, 2012), which was tested for significance against chance level
using a binomial test); (3) simulating choice data (100 simulations/par-
ticipant) of the task based on the inferred parameters and running the
same behavioral analysis on simulated choice data (using the median of
the 100 simulations/subject), as for the empirical data; and (4) refitting
the simulated choice data as a recovery analysis and determining the
correlation between parameters inferred from empirical data with pa-
rameters inferred from simulated data.
MRI data acquisition. Functional imaging was performed using a 3
tesla SiemensTrio scanner to acquire gradient echoT2*-weighted echop-
lanar images with blood oxygenation level-dependent contrast. Covering
the whole brain, 40 slices were acquired in oblique orientation at 20° to
the anterior commissure–posterior commissure line and in ascending
order, with 2.5 mm thickness, 3	 3 mm2 in-plane voxel resolution, 0.5
mm gap between slices, TR 2.09 s, TE 22ms, and flip angle  90°.
Before functional scanning, a field distortion map was collected to ac-
count for individual homogeneity differences of the magnetic field. Ad-
ditionally, T1-weighted anatomical images were acquired.
Preprocessing of fMRI data. For fMRI data analysis, we used SPM8
(http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/software/spm8/). Images were cor-
rected for delay of slice time acquisition. Voxel-displacement maps were
estimated based on acquired fieldmaps. To correct formotion, all images
were realigned, and additionally corrected for distortion and the interac-
tion of distortion and motion. The images were spatially normalized to
Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) space using normalization pa-
rameters generated during the segmentation of the individual T1-
weighted structural image (Ashburner and Friston, 2005); thereafter, all
images were spatially smoothedwith an isotropic Gaussian kernel (6mm
full-width at half-maximum).
Statistical analysis of functional MRI. The aim of the statistical analysis
was to elucidate neural signatures of RPEs for chosen values as a function
of SU versus DU learning and potential group differences. Based on each
individual’s set of parameters identified during model fitting (random-
effects parameters), we computed regressors for the statistical analysis of
fMRI data. Using the general linear model approach as implemented in
SPM8, smoothed images were analyzed in an event-related manner. At
the first level, onsets of feedback were entered into the model and con-
volved with the canonical hemodynamic response function and modu-
lated parametrically by two trial-by-trial regressors from our modeling
analysis, as follows: first, individual RPEs for chosen values were com-
puted based on of the SUmodel with 0 (RPESU). Second, a difference
regressor was entered reflecting the difference of RPEDU  RPESU. To
build this regressor, individual RPEs for chosen values were computed
based on the DU model with   1 (RPEDU) and subtracted from the
RPESU described above. This procedure accounts for collinearity be-
tween the regressors and reflects unique variance due to double-update
computations beyond the single-update RPE (for the same analytic ap-
proach, please compare with Daw et al., 2011). The difference between
RPEDU and RPESU reflects the difference in chosen values from the DU
and SU algorithms. In the iDU model, this difference is reflected in the
estimate of  (illustrated in Fig. 1C). Throughout the article, the second
parametric modulator (the difference regressor) is referred to as RPEDU.
Missing trials were modeled separately. To account for possible con-
founds due to movement, we included the six realignment parameters,
the first temporal derivative of the translational realignment parameters
and a further regressor censoring scan-to-scanmovement of1mm. At
the second level, contrast images for RPESU and RPEDU were taken to a
random-effects analysis. A full-factorial ANOVA contained the type of
RPEs (RPESU/RPEDU) as the within-subject factor, and group as the
between-subject factor.
Voxel-basedmorphometry. Each subject’s anatomical T1-weighted im-
age was segmented into different tissue classes using the unified segmen-
tation approach implemented in SPM8 (Ashburner and Friston, 2005).
Modulated images of gray matter density were smoothed using an iso-
tropic Gaussian kernel (6 mm full-width at half-maximum) and sub-
jected to a random-effects model. The volume of gray matter, white
matter, and CSF tissue classes were summed to gain an individual esti-
mate of total intracranial volume, which was entered as a covariate in
between-group comparisons. As there is strong evidence for pronounced
cortical gray matter density loss in alcohol-dependent individuals (Beck
et al., 2012), we first tested for differences in gray matter density between
the patient group and the control group. The patient group was charac-
terized by significantly reduced gray matter density (FWE corrected for
the whole brain, p 0.05) predominantly in a large cluster covering the
cingulate cortex (see Table 7). Second, to control for differences in gray
matter density as a potential confound of our fMRI results, we extracted
gray matter density from the following two regions of interest: (1) based
on the fMRI analysis, the conjunction of both RPEs across the entire
sample (thresholded at FWE corrected, p  0.05); and (2) an anatomi-
cally predefined mask of combining frontal lobe and cingulate cortex
(obtained from AAL templates, WFUPickAtlas Toolbox).
Results
Behavioral raw data analyses
Correct choices
An ANOVA revealed a significant effect of phase (F 21.76, p
0.001) and group (F  19.97, p  0.001), and a significant
group	 phase interaction (F 3.27, p 0.04, Fig. 2C).
Win–stay and lose–shift
We further explored patients’ deficit in correct choices by analyz-
ing how often participants repeated choices after reward, “win–
stay,” and shifted after losses, “lose–shift.” A between-group
difference was observed on win–stay (t  2.23, p  0.03) with
patients showing less stay behavior after wins (control subjects:
mean, 0.93; SD, 0.06; patients: mean, 0.87; SD, 0.14). There was
no difference in lose–shift (t 0.25, p 0.80).
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Repeating choices despite recurrent negative consequences
We found a significant between-group difference (t 2.63, p
0.01) in repetition behavior after two successive losses (control
subjects: mean, 0.11; SD, 0.08; patients: mean, 0.18; SD, 0.14);
patients reiterated disadvantageous choices more often, despite
negative consequences in preceding trials.
Computational modeling of behavior
Computational modeling: model comparison
Using random-effects Bayesian model selection (BMS) (Stephan
et al., 2009) across control subjects and patients, the iDU model
with  as a free parameter, and with separate learning rates and
temperatures for reward and punishment trials (rew, pun, 
rew,

pun) peaked out of 14models (XPiDU 0.71, PPiDU 0.27). The
overall superiority of separate learning rates and temperatures for
reward and punishment trials was also confirmedwhen grouping





with the first two families containing four models each (SU, DU,
iDU, and Sutton-K1) and the latter two each consisting of three
models (SU, DU, and iDU) because it is not straightforward to











Importantly, when running BMS for both groups separately
across all 14 models, control subjects and patients differed re-
garding the model that explained their behavior relatively better
(Fig. 3A, Table 2); control subjectswere best explained by the iDU
model that includes inference on the task structure given by the
parameter , an individual weight of the degree of DU learning
(XPiDU  0.92, PPiDU  0.27). Patients were relatively better
explained by the model-free SU algorithm, which neglects an
update of the alternative choice option (XPSU  0.83, PPSU 
0.27).We verified that these group differences were not driven by
a small subgroupof patients. Looking at individual relativemodel
fit, 23 of 35 healthy control subjects were better explained by the
iDUmodel than by the SUmodel, 25 of 43 patientswere relatively
better explained by the SU model than by the iDU model.
Details regarding BMS can be found in Table 2, including log-
likelihoods, log model evidence, and PPs and XPs for all 14 mod-
els separately for control subjects and patients. As requested by
one of our reviewers, we fitted both groups separately, and this







Computational modeling: identifiability, absolute model fit, and
simulated choice data
All reported quality checks refer to the iDU model, which was
best fitting across all participants. First, the rank of the Jacobian
matrix equaled the number of free parameters in the model, in-
dicating the identifiability of themodel (Bamber and van Santen,
1985, 2000). Correlations between all parameters were acceptable
(r  0.36); only temperatures showed relatively strong correla-
tions at r 0.67 but were, however, consistently different for win
and loss trials, in terms of being higher for wins than losses in all
but two individuals. Second, adjusted McFadden’s pseudo-R2
(R2  0.60) indicated reasonable absolute model fit. Only one
healthy participant and six alcohol-dependent patients were not
fit better than chance by any of the tested models. Notably, all
relative model comparison results reported above were robust
against excluding these participants who were not fitted better
than chance (control subjects: XPiDU22




 0.28). Third, choice
data were simulated based on the inferred parameters of the best-
fitting iDU model and tested in the same manner as the original
empirical data to establish whether the model replicates group
differences on choice behavior (correct choices, win–stay, repe-
tition of punished actions). As we were interested in the replica-
tion of the empirically found effect, hypotheses were directed,
and one-tailed tests were used. The model replicated the main
effect of group on correct choices (t 3.52, p 0.001), as well as
the group effect on win–stay rates (t  3.20, p  0.001) and on
repetition behavior after punishment (t  1.86, p  0.03). In-
ferred model parameters did not recover the group 	 phase in-
teraction observed in the raw data. Fourth, when refitting the
simulated choice data, we observed strong correlations of mod-
eling parameters derived from the empirical data and modeling
parameters derived from the simulated data (correlation coeffi-
cients: rew  0.55, pun  0.87, 
rew  0.65, 

























































Figure 3. Computational modeling results. A, Bayesian model selection revealed that
healthy control subjectswerebest explainedby the iDUmodel, includinga factorwhichweights
the individual degree of inference (double-updating),whereas for alcohol-dependent patients,
model evidence was maximal in favor of the model-free single-update model. Models with
separate learning rates and temperatures for rewardandpunishment trials outperformedmod-
elswithout this distinction.B, Between-group comparisons on the inferred parameters derived
from the best-fitting model (MANOVA) revealed a significant group difference on the parame-
ters (F 2.83, p 0.03). Post hoc tests showed that the iDU punishment parameter was
significantly lower in alcohol-dependent subjects comparedwith healthy control subjects (F
7.89, p  0.006). There were no significant group differences in any of the other inferred
parameters of the model. Error bars indicate Standard Errors of the Mean.
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Computational modeling: group differences on model parameters
We tested for between-group differences in individuals fit bet-
ter than chance by subjecting the inferred parameters of the
iDU model, the best-fitting model across both groups (Table
3), to a multivariate ANOVA (MANOVA) with group as the
between-subject factor (patients vs control subjects). This
MANOVA contained the following parameters, each sepa-
rately for reward and punishment: learning rates for the up-
date of chosen (rew_c, pun_c) and unchosen values (rew_uc,
pun_uc, products of the weighting factor  with rew_c, and
pun_c), eachmultiplied by the temperature for reward or pun-
ishment trials, respectively. This revealed a significant effect of
the between-subject factor group (F  2.83, p  0.03). We
explored this group difference using post hoc t tests to compare
each of the parameters between groups. In line with the raw
data results, we found a significantly lower DU-weighted pun-
ishment parameter (pun_uc 	 
pun, F  7.89, p  0.006; Fig.
3B), whereas none of the other parameters differed signifi-
cantly between groups (group differences regarding learning
rates of the simpler model-free SU algorithm, all p  0.66).
Note that the group difference on the DU-weighted punish-
ment parameter was also present when comparing parameters
derived from the less well fitting model, with only one temper-
ature parameter for both reward and punishment trials (t 
2.35, p  0.02).
Association of modeling parameters with repetition of choices
despite recurrent punishment
A multiple regression model with the perseveration score (re-
peating choices despite recurrent punishment) as the dependent
variable, and the DU and SU parameters for reward and punish-
ment, respectively, as predictors (R2 0.27; adjusted R2 0.24)
revealed a significant negative association specifically of the DU
punishment parameter with the perseveration score (
0.41,
t  2.79, p  0.002). All other parameters did not significantly
predict the perseveration score (all t values 1.69, all p values
0.10). This suggests that a deficit in double-update punishment
learning, possibly conflated with decision noise in these very tri-
als, as indicated by selective between-group differences in mod-




Neural signatures of single- and double-update learning
To explore neural signatures of this behavioral deficit, we an-
alyzed the encoding of two types of RPEs for the chosen op-
tion, namely RPESU versus RPEDU. Effects for both types of
learning signatures and their conjunction across both groups
are illustrated in Figure 4, and in Tables 4, 5, and 6. For
between-group differences, we tested for a type of RPE
(RPESU/RPEDU) 	 group (patients/control subjects) interac-
tion. The conjunction of both RPEs across the entire sample
(thresholded at FWE-corrected p  0.05 for the whole brain;
Fig. 4, Table 6) was used to correct for multiple comparisons
(at FWE-corrected p 0.05 based on this search volume). The
RPE type 	 group interaction reached significance in the
mPFC (X10, Y 62, Z 12; t 3.98; FWE-corrected for
the conjunction, p 0.01) and posterior cingulate cortex (X
0, Y40, Z 32; t 3.72; FWE-corrected for the conjunc-
tion, p 0.03). As post hoc contrast, we compared RPESU and
RPEDU between groups. This confirmed significantly reduced








HC ALC HC ALC HC ALC HC ALC HC ALC HC ALC
SU
LL 2993.93 1677.98 2755.87 1739.54 2941.53 1639.73 2710.18 1879.34 3089.06 1747.73 2861.72
ML 3118.23 1829.92 2948.64 1913.68 3072.59 1810.17 2931.40 1951.19 3160.13 1845.10 3026.89
PP 0.0193 0.0467 0.0914 0.0553 0.0214 0.0872 0.2678 0.0251 0.0730 0.1136 0.0366
XP 0.0000 0.0008 0.0057 0.0015 0.0000 0.0093 0.8259 0.0001 0.0019 0.0294 0.0001
DU
LL 2997.30 1664.18 2773.74 1792.02 2963.30 1670.50 2764.38
ML 3201.00 1857.98 3059.58 1974.00 3242.14 1855.03 3086.95
PP 0.0204 0.0617 0.1035 0.0239 0.0191 0.0961 0.0485
XP 0.0000 0.0022 0.0105 0.0001 0.0000 0.0143 0.0003
iDU
LL 2875.53 1562.88 2628.62 1668.27 2848.17 1546.36 2584.38
ML 3056.65 1771.15 2935.57 1870.86 3052.73 1756.96 2888.28
PP 0.0349 0.1063 0.0458 0.0340 0.0373 0.2685 0.1811
XP 0.0001 0.0221 0.0002 0.0003 0.0001 0.9195 0.1552
All models were compared using Bayesian model selection. We report log likelihoods (LLs), marginalized log likelihood (ML), exceedance probabilities (XPs), and expected posterior probabilities (PPs). HC, healthy control subjects; ALC,
alcohol-dependent patients.
Table 3. iDUmodel: best fitting parameters

reward 
punish reward punish K*reward K*punish
Healthy control subjects 4.29 1.18 2.04 1.48 0.58 0.22 0.47 0.25 0.10 0.11 0.09 0.12
25th P 3.16 25th P 1.00 25th 0.43 25th 0.29 25th P 0.02 25th P 0.01
50th P 4.55 50th P 1.75 50th 0.59 50th 0.45 50th P 0.06 50th P 0.04
75th 5.02 75th P 2.52 75th 0.76 75th 0.71 75th P 0.13 75th P 0.10
Alcohol-dependent patients 4.24 0.98 1.58 1.22 0.51 0.31 0.47 0.32 0.07 0.11 0.04 0.05
25th P 3.62 25th P 0.84 25th P 0.22 25th P 0.11 25th P 0.01 25th P 0.01
50th P 4.19 50th P 1.31 50th P 0.49 50th P 0.54 50th P 0.02 50th P 0.02
75th P 4.99 75th P 1.68 75th P 0.82 75th P 0.72 75th P 0.08 75th P 0.06
Data are reported as the mean SD, unless otherwise indicated. Only multiplications of decision noise beta with learning parameters are reported in the Results section. P, Percentile.
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coding of RPEDU signatures in patients in the mPFC (X8,
Y 62, Z 12; t 4.36; FWE-corrected for the conjunction,
p  0.003; X  6, Y  56, Z  12; t  3.68; FWE-corrected
for the conjunction, p  0.02; Fig. 5) and posterior cingulate
cortex (X2, Y42, Z 32, t 3.72; FWE-corrected for
the conjunction, p  0.03) but no significant between-group
differences in activation elicited by model-free RPESU. We
verified that the result of significantly reduced coding of
RPEDU signatures in patients in the mPFC was robust against
excluding participants that were not fitted better than chance
by any of the models. Indeed, when ex-
cluding these n  7 participants, the
group difference remained significant
(X  8, Y  62, Z  12; t  4.24;
FWE-corrected for the conjunction,
ppeak 0.001; and X6, Y 56, Z
12; t 3.78; FWE-corrected for the con-
junction, ppeak  0.011).
In further analyses, we were inter-
ested in exploring associations of the
observed reduced neural representation
of RPEDU in the mPFC with observed
behavioral deficits and symptoms.
Thus, mean parameter estimates at the
peak of the between-group difference
(X  8, Y  62, Z  12, surrounded
with an 8 mm sphere) were extracted to
correlate them, for both groups sepa-
rately, with the DU punishment param-
eter pun_uc by 
_pun. Note that this
approach is valid as we were specifically
interested in associations of the neural
reduction observed in patients versus
control subjects (i.e., the neural group
difference) with patients’ behavioral
deficit and symptoms. We did, however,
not use the peak coordinate of the group
difference to test further between-group
hypotheses on the neural level, which
would lead to circular inference, or
“double dipping” (Kriegeskorte et al., 2009).
In patients, this revealed a positive association indicating that
the attenuated mPFC double-update learning signature was re-
lated to a lower DU punishment parameter (Spearman’s r 
0.493, p  0.006; Fig. 5C left panel). No significant correlation
was found in control subjects (Spearman’s r 0.090, p 0.61).
This confirms a link between the observed behavioral deficit in
updating alternative options after punishment and the reduction
of DU signatures in mPFC in patients.
Relationship between mPFC double-update learning signatures
and symptom severity
We tested for an association of the reported neural alterations
with symptom severity in alcohol-dependent patients. We
performed a linear regression analysis with mean parameter
estimates of the global maximum of the observed group dif-
ference in mPFC (at the peak voxel X  8, Y  62, Z  12,
with an 8-mm-radius sphere) as the dependent variable and
the applied self-rating measurements of addiction severity
(Table 1) as predictor variables, as follows: (1) units of alcohol
consumed within 4 weeks before treatment commenced
(TLFB); (2) OCDS; (3) ACQ; and (4) AUDIT. This revealed
the OCDS score as having a significant negative association
with the neural mPFC DU learning signature (
0.64, t
2.64, p 0.01; Fig. 5C right panel). Patients reporting a higher
level of obsessive-compulsive drinking habits showed, on the
neural level, lower coding of inference components regarding
unchosen choice options. An additional regression model
with the same independent variables and the DU punishment
parameter as the dependent variable did not indicate any sig-
nificant results (p values 0.52).
Figure 4. Neural coding of single-update vs double-update signals across the entire sample. Across all participants (patients
and control subjects), we observed model-free RPESU in bilateral ventral striatum, and medial and lateral prefrontal cortex (FWE-
corrected for the whole brain, p 0.05; Table 4). For the difference regressor RPEDU, we found effects in overlapping regions
(bilateral ventral striatum,medial and lateral prefrontal cortex) and additionally in hippocampus and insula (FWE corrected for the
whole brain, p 0.05; Table 5). The conjunction of both contrasts revealed overlapping effects of RPESU and RPEDU, in bilateral
ventral striatum,medial and lateral prefrontal cortex, and posterior cingulate cortex (FWE corrected for thewhole brain, p 0.05;
Table 6). The latter was used as a search volume for small-volume correction of group differences. Effects are reported using a
significance level ofp0.05, FWE corrected for thewhole brain. Activations are shown superimposed on an averagedgraymatter
mask of the entire sample. For display purposes, threshold is set at t 5.
Table 4. Neural signatures of single-update learning (RPESU ) for both healthy
control subjects and alcohol-dependent patients taken together at p< 0.05 FWE
whole brain corrected
Single-update signals
MNI coordinates Cluster size t
Peak p value
(FWE corrected)
Ventral striatum 8, 8,10 57 8.66 0.001
Ventral striatum 12, 8,10 82 8.54 0.001
Middle orbital gyrus 6, 42,8 201 7.89 0.001
Middle orbital gyrus 8, 60, 4 6.18 0.001
Superior medial gyrus 10, 64, 12 80 6.00 0.001
Middle orbital gyrus 6, 54, 2 5.85 0.002
Anterior cingulate gyrus 6, 44, 6 34 6.10 0.001
Anterior cingulate gyrus 4, 30, 16 14 5.62 0.004
Middle orbitofrontal gyrus 24, 32,16 20 5.55 0.006
Putamen 26,6, 6 21 5.62 0.004
Putamen 26, 0, 2 17 5.53 0.006
Posterior cingulate gyrus 0,34, 34 68 6.30 0.001
Precuneus 4,50, 16 29 5.55 0.006
Angular gyrus 46,70, 34 17 5.46 0.008
Cerebellum 44,74,34 161 6.80 0.001
Cerebellum 36,72,40 93 6.20 0.001
Cerebellum 44,72,32 5.49 0.008
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Covariance analyses for possible confounding factors
To adjust for possible confounding influences, the following
variables were included as covariates in the behavioral (correct
choices and the DU punishment learning parameter) and
fMRI analyses (RPE type 	 group interaction, group differ-
ence on RPEDU coding): smoking status; depression score
(Beck’s depression inventory; Beck et al, 1996); and the com-
posite measure of neurocognitive functioning as well as gray
matter density (voxel-based morphometry, based on a func-
tional and an anatomically predefined mask of frontolimbic
structures). All reported results remained significant when
adjusting for these possible confounds (all p values 0.05).
Discussion
Weprovidenovel insight intomechanismsofmaladaptive decision-
making and behavioral adaptation in patients with alcohol depen-
dence and its underlying neural substrates. Our results support the
view of intact model-free learning and behavioral control in addic-
tion associated with a deficit in using environmental structure to
guide decision-making: choice behavior in patients was best ex-
plained by a model-free RL algorithm, which neglects the updating
of alternative choice options. This was due to a specific reduction in
the updating of the alternative option after punishments. On the
neural level, the learning signature of such adouble-updatingmech-
anism was reduced in patients’ mPFC and correlated with the ob-
served behavioral deficit in updating alternative choices as well as
obsessive-compulsive drinking habits.
Disrupted behavioral adaptation in addiction
Deficits in cognitive flexibility are known in patients experienc-
ing addiction (Bechara and Damasio, 2002; Garavan and Stout,
2005; Ersche et al., 2011; Goldstein and Volkow, 2011). In line
with this, we demonstrate that alcohol-dependent patients show
diminished behavioral adaptation in a dynamic environment.
Crucially, by using computational modeling, we provide amech-
anistic account for this deficit: alcohol-dependent patients are
specifically impaired in their capacity to integrate alternative
choice options and to accurately track the value of an alternative
option after having received punishment. Put differently, pa-
tients show less consideration of “what might have been good
instead”: formally, after patients had received punishment for the
chosen option, they did not increase the values of the alternative
option as would have been appropriate according to the anticor-
related task structure, whichwas captured by a significantly lower
double-update punishment parameter in patients. This finding
derived from computational modeling can account for the over-
all impairment in correct decisions, reduced win-staying, and the
repetition of choices despite successive punishment, as suggested
by our simulation analysis. Therefore, our observation suggests
that simpler, model-free, single-update learning is intact in ad-
diction (such that the updating of chosen values after rewards
and punishments remains relatively unaffected), but that updat-
ing of alternative, unchosen values is abolished after punishment.
Such inference on what might have happened goes awry when
values need adjustment after negative feedback, and thus poten-
tially advantageous alternative choice options are neglected when
making decisions. The finding is in line with recent animal
models of addiction suggesting a specific deficit in mentally sim-
ulating outcomes not directly experienced and a disturbed inte-
gration of multiple predictions (Lucantonio et al., 2014).
Table 5. Neural signatures of double-update learning (RPEDU ) for both healthy
control subjects and alcohol-dependent patients taken together at p< 0.05 FWE
whole brain corrected
Double-update signals
MNI coordinates Cluster size t
Peak p value
(FWE corrected)
Middle orbital gyrus 2, 56,4 2681 11.20 0.001
Rectal gyrus 6, 44,10 10.52 0.001
Inferior frontal gyrus 34, 36,10 10.20 0.001
Inferior frontal gyrus 34, 36,12 86 6.77 0.001
Superior frontal gyrus 12, 48, 36 190 6.65 0.001
Superior frontal gyrus 18, 38, 50 5.79 0.002
Middle frontal gyrus 24, 32, 50 5.76 0.002
Insula 38,2, 14 37 5.88 0.001
Ventral striatum 6, 8,10 386 7.43 0.001
Ventral striatum 10, 12,8 7.01 0.001
Anterior cingulate cortex 2, 20, 0 6.66 0.001
Caudate 20, 18, 26 52 5.59 0.005
Hippocampus 30,12,18 188 7.61 0.001
Hippocampus 32,28,10 5.88 0.001
Fusiform gyrus 32,36,14 5.5 0.007
Hippocampus 38,24,14 52 6.44 0.001
Fusiform area 42,18,18 5.88 0.001
Posterior cingulate gyrus 2,42, 32 1201 9.05 0.001
Precuneus 6,54, 18 8.7 0.001
Posterior cingulate gyrus 4,52, 26 8.14 0.001
Middle temporal gyrus 50,70, 22 180 6.23 0.001
Angular gyrus 46,72, 32 5.96 0.001
Middle temporal gyrus 44,60, 22 5.92 0.001
Middle temporal gyrus 58,8,22 29 6.25 0.001
Middle temporal gyrus 60,10,20 52 6.12 0.001
Superior temporal gyrus 68,22, 14 17 5.5 0.016
Superior temporal gyrus 60,24, 16 5.19 0.025
Temporal pole 56, 2, 6 22 5.79 0.002
Operculum 44,20, 20 40 5.67 0.004
Precentral gyrus 42,16, 62 6.14 0.001
Postcentral gyrus 40,26, 58 69 5.07 0.038
Table 6. fMRI whole-brain results for the conjunction of single-update and double-
update learning signals across both groups
Region MNI coordinates k
Cluster p value
(FWE corrected) t value
Peak p value
(FWE corrected)
Superior medial gyrus 10, 64, 12
79 0.001
6 0.001
Middle orbital gyrus 6, 54, 2 5.85 0.002
Middle orbital gyrus 6, 42,8
174 0.001
7.46 0.001
Middle orbital gyrus 8, 60, 4 6.18 0.001
Middle orbital gyrus 24, 32,16 19 0.001 5.55 0.006
Ventral striatum 8, 8,10 43 0.001 7.39 0.001
Ventral striatum 10, 12,8 66 0.001 7.01 0.001
Posterior cingulate gyrus 0,34, 34 56 0.001 6.30 0.001
Precuneus 4,50, 16 25 0.001 5.55 0.006
Only clusters k 15 are depicted.







Supplementary motor cortex 2, 4, 48 523 7.59 0.001
Superior medial gyrus 2, 30, 38 7.587.11 0.001
Middle cingulate cortex 0, 12, 38 0.001
Superior medial gyrus 4, 52, 38 26 7.44 0.001
Middle cingulate cortex 0,32, 46 378 7.25 0.001
Middle cingulate cortex 2,40, 50 6.53 0.001
Precuneus 0,46, 38 6.44 0.002
Precuneus 2,78, 40 22 6.41 0.002
Anterior cingulate 2, 48, 16 24 6.36 0.003
Frontal pole 50, 48, 26 24 5.93 0.012
Control subjects alcohol-dependent patients at FWE whole brain corrected p 0.05.
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Intriguingly, this behavioral deficit resonates well with clinical
observations and diagnostic criteria of addiction describing the
maintenance of disadvantageous behaviors despite negative con-
sequences. Importantly, our finding goes beyond previous stud-
ies on behavioral adaptation linking addiction to blunted neural
responses associated with performance errors and reduced error
awareness (Paulus et al., 2008; Goldstein et al., 2009): a disturbed
inference process regarding the update of alternative choice op-
tions may constitute one plausible explanation for these deficits.
In studies applying tasks similar to the one used here, inference
aboutalternative choiceoptionshasbeenpreviously linked toagoal-
directed ormodel-based control system (Hampton et al., 2006; Bro-
mberg-Martin et al., 2010). An alternative explanation includes that
double-update inference does not arise from a fullmodel-based sys-
tem but rather reflects temporal difference learning about the rela-
tionship of choice values (Shohamy andWagner, 2008;Wimmer et
al., 2012; Doll et al., 2015). In this framework, our results could be
interpreted as an impairment in generalizing from one stimulus to
another. Either way, the capacity to simultaneously updatemultiple
decision values, including those of unobserved outcomes, might be
regarded as sine quanon for building andusing an internalmodel of
the environment, which is important for goal-directed or model-
based control. Using sequential decision-making, reduced model-
based behavioral control was observed in
alcohol-dependent patients (Sebold et al.,
2014), although this impairment was atten-
uated when adjusting for cognitive deficits.
In the present study, the impairment in up-
dating alternative choice options remained
significant when adjusting for cognitive ca-
pacities, suggesting a specific characteristic
for alcohol dependence rather than an epi-
phenomenonof a global impairment. Thus,
our finding of reduced inferential capacities
appends prominent theories proposing a
shift from goal-directed to habitual behav-
ioral control in addiction (Everitt and Rob-
bins, 2005; Dayan, 2009; Lucantonio et al.,
2012).
Blunted mPFC double-update learning
signatures in alcohol-dependent
patients
Patientswere characterized by reduced cod-
ing of double-update RPE signals inmPFC.
Reduced representation of these inference
signatures in patients’ mPFC was related to
theobservedbehavioraldeficit and toobses-
sive-compulsive drinking habits. In line
with our findings, alcohol-dependent pa-
tients showedhypoactivation ina similar re-
gion for a contrast assessing goal-directed
learning during a different instrumental
learning task (Sjoerds et al., 2013). In
healthy individuals, the medial prefrontal
and orbitofrontal cortex is known to en-
code model-based values computed “on
the fly,” which allows behavioral flexi-
bility (Haber and Behrens, 2014). In
consonance with this, the mPFC has
been identified as a key region for flexi-
ble behavioral adaptation and model-
based evaluation (Hampton et al., 2006;
Daw et al., 2011). Specifically, this region has been linked to
the integration of computations from habitual and
goal-directed systems (Lee et al., 2014). Interestingly, Lee et al.
(2014) identified computational signals for the reliability of
both systems in the mPFC. Reliability signals are thought to be
used by an arbitration mechanism to allocate the degree of
control exerted by one of the two systems at a given point in
time. Our observation of reduced double-update signatures at
nearby coordinates may support a view on behavioral control
in addiction that Lee et al. (2014) invite in their discussion: a
failure of the arbitration process, namely the ability to appro-
priately parse behavioral control between different modes. Re-
markably, reduced coding of double-update inference
components in alcohol-dependent patients’ mPFC remained
significant when adjusting for reductions in gray matter den-
sity supporting the view of a specific neural signature of abol-
ished inference. This interpretation is strengthened by
correlations of mPFC signatures with reduced double-update
learning rates after punishment and obsessive drinking habits
in patients. Together, reduced double-update prediction error
coding in alcohol-dependent patients’ mPFC may indeed ac-
count for their decreased behavioral flexibility and constitute
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Figure 5. Group differences in the neural coding of single-update vs double-update signals. A, Reduced inference signatures
were found in the mPFC in alcohol-dependent patients compared with healthy control subjects (X8, Y 62, Z 12; t
4.36; FWE-corrected for the conjunction, p 0.003; X6, Y 56, Z 12; t 3.68; FWE corrected for the conjunction, p
0.02) and posterior cingulate cortex (X2, Y42, Z 32; FWE corrected for the conjunction, p 0.03; t 3.72). No
group difference regarding model-free signatures was found. For display purposes, thresholded at t 3. B, Plot of parameter
estimates at the peaks of the group difference in the mPFC. C, In patients, parameter estimates from an 8-mm-radius sphere
around the peak coordinate (X8, Y 62, Z 12) of the group difference correlated with the behavioral deficit in double-
update learning after punishments (left: Spearman’s r 0.49, p 0.006). A multiple regression model including all applied
measures of disease severity as explanatory variables predicting these parameter estimates revealed the sum score of the
obsessive-compulsive drinking scale as the only significant predictor (OCDS;
0.64, t 2.64, p 0.014; right). Here, we
plot Studentized residuals of the OCDS with respect to other disease severity measures.
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one piece in the puzzle of obsessive alcohol consumption de-
spite negative consequences.
Neurochemical considerations
Blunted presynaptic dopamine function was found in alcohol-
addicted patients (Martinez et al., 2005), and lower levels of
ventral striatal presynaptic dopamine were demonstrated to
be associated with a lower degree of model-based behavioral
control and diminished coding of model-based prefrontal sig-
natures during sequential decision-making (Deserno et al.,
2015b). Thus, low levels of presynaptic dopamine could hypo-
thetically explain the reported findings to some extent. Fur-
ther, reduced dopamine D2 receptor availability is among the
best-established findings in addiction (Volkow et al., 1990;
Heinz et al., 2004). Low levels of D2 receptors were linked to an
impairment of re-evaluating decisions via the prefrontal
cortex after negative feedback (Frank et al., 2004; Goto and
Grace, 2005). Recent evidence from an animal model indicates
that chronic alcohol-induced malfunction of, specifically,
mPFC D2/D4 receptors disrupts flexible behavioral adaptation
(Trantham-Davidson et al., 2014), which is in consonance
with the presented findings. Interestingly, a behavioral study
in humans showed that genetic variability in dopaminergic
neurotransmission relates to perseveration during reversal
learning (den Ouden et al., 2013), also supporting the view
that dopamine could at least partially account for the behavior
observed in alcohol-dependent patients.
Limitations
Whether diminished inference about alternative choice op-
tions arises as a consequence of long-term alcohol consump-
tion or reflects a predisposition factor for the development of
addictive behavior cannot be elucidated by a cross-sectional
design. Groups differed in terms of general cognition, smok-
ing status, and gray matter density even though our results
were robust when adjusting for these variables. Cross-
sectional studies in at-risk populations (Ersche et al., 2010;
Reiter et al., 2016), and longitudinal designs are warranted to
track the influence of dysfunctional behavioral control sys-
tems across different stages in the development of addiction. It
is to be noted that our model was not able to capture one
specific aspect of the observed choice behavior, namely the
group 	 phase interaction on correct choices due to particu-
larly reduced performance in the middle and last phase. Addi-
tional analyses of reaction times, missed choices, and self-
report data consistently showed that this was not due to a
general decline in performance over the course of the experi-
ment in patients. Apart from this aspect, all empirical choice
data effects could be replicated by the model, and measures of
absolute model fit and identifiability indicated that the ap-
plied models served as a good explanation for the observed
behavior.
Although the best-fitting model was technically invertible, as
indicated by our identifiability checks, we have to caution that
there is a lack of specificity within these parameters with respect
to which specific parameter determines certain aspects of the
choice behavior, especially with regard to the decision noise and
the learning rates. We therefore used multiplications of those
parameters to ensure stable between-group comparisons (Daw,
2009)
Summary
In conclusion, after punishment, alcohol-dependent patients
showed a deficit to infer and integrate alternative choice op-
tions in their decisions. Our data provide the first neuroimag-
ing support for reduced coding of this double-update
inference process in the mPFC—a key region for flexible be-
havioral control—underlying this deficit. The same mPFC
signatures were negatively related to obsessive-compulsive
drinking habits. The computational psychiatry account ap-
plied here improves our understanding of the perplexing
question of why addicted individuals continue drug consump-
tion despite negative consequences.
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